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Article 26 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) confers on the human person, the right to free education in 
society.  This implies that the human person is morally empowered 
and therefore justified to demand an access to education. By 
insisting that education be made free, Article 26 of the UDHR has 
made access to education a matter of right, since human rights are 
free conferment of nature. However, the education that Article 26 
tried to justify here using the traditional moral rights arguments is 
the basic or elementary and fundamental stages of education. Post-
basic education which includes technical and professional education 
and other advanced institutional learning, and which contributes 
more to a person’s socio-political, economic and technological 
development, would according to Article 26 “…be made generally 
available…and accessible to all on the basis of merit”. This caveat, 
the paper contends, places this level of education in need of further 
justification, so as to provide a moral basis for the citizens’ claim 
and indeed access to education generally, beyond the level of basic 
education. To achieve this, the essay deploys arguments from the 
pragmatic and utilitarian theories to philosophically justify 
professional and technical education, as well as advanced 
institutional learning, as a way of validating the citizens’ right to 
education in modern human society, beyond the level of basic 
education.  








Education is generally regarded the world over, as one of the 
fundamental rights of the human person in the modern society.  This 
thinking is founded on Article 26 of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which documents education as one of the 
fundamental human rights in the post-war human society.  The 
implication of this documentation is that the human person is 
morally empowered as well as justified to demand an access to 
education.  However, the UDHR justification for education on the 
basis of right only supports basic education and this raises the 
critical problem of how to justify the citizens’ claim to education 
beyond the level of basic education. In other words, how do we 
morally justify the rights of citizens to technical and professional 
education as well as advanced institutional learning which on the 
recommendation of Article 26, should be made generally available 
and accessible to all [but] on the basis of merit? This has become 
imperative in view of the fact that this latter component of education 
is more economically, culturally and socio-politically significant 
than the former in the life of the human person. It is true that basic 
education provides the necessary foundation for the development of 
the human person, but this foundation, without the latter meaningful 
superstructure of higher education, would not take the human person 
far, in being economically productive, socio-politically relevant, and 
technologically aware. In this essay, therefore, we deploy 
complementary arguments from the pragmatic and utilitarian 
perspectives to show the imperativeness of technical/professional 
education and advanced institutional learning [herein after referred 
to as higher education], to addressing the socio-economic, political, 
environmental and other developmental crises that confront people 
in their quest for meaningful existence. This is with a view to 
providing justification for the citizens’ access and indeed right to 
education at the higher level, beyond that provided by the traditional 
moral rights argument for basic education.  
Education and Human Right:  Conceptual Clarifications 
Being the concepts of primary focus in the paper, education and 
human right therefore stand in need of clarification.  The word 
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educate is derived from the Latin word educare.  According to 
Reinberg, the Latin words, Ex and Ducere combined to form 
educare.  As he explains it: 
Ex was a common preposition used in the Latin 
language that simply meant “from, out of, from 
within”.  As this word was common in every day 
speech, ex was often shortened to e…. Ducere is the 
infinitive form of the Latin verb Duco, which means 
“to lead, conduct, guide, etc”.  Once the preposition 
ex was prefixed to ducere, the ending for the verb 
changes from – ere to – are.  Hence, we get the 
construction of the word educate.
1 
 
Therefore, the word educate is literally translated into “to draw out 
of, lead out of, etc.”
2
 Furthermore, Reinberg states that the noun, 
educatio derives from the verb educare.  Educatio is a Latin noun 
meaning the act of educating,
3
 which must have translated into the 
English word education. 
However, the claim that education means bringing or 
drawing out (perhaps of ignorance) has not been generally accepted.  
For Fenstermacher “the purpose of education is not to lead anyone 
anywhere, but is rather to help one become aware of where he has 
been and where he might like to go.”
4
 Although, the two conceptual 
understandings of education given above seem dissimilar, they 
however have one fundamental thing in common, and this is the 
epistemological content. When someone is made to become aware of 
his/her present status, the end-point of such self-knowledge is to 
enable him/her to properly plan his/her present life and direct future 
steps.  And, this understanding is expressive in the etymological 
account of the concept of education.  After all, the self-knowledge 
no doubt brings or draws out the human person from a prior state of 
self-ignorance and puts him/her on a pedestal of awareness. 
In Dewey’s own opinion, education is a continuous 
reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the 
meaning of experience and which increases ability to direct the 
course of subsequent experience.
5
 This definition of education also 
affirms our earlier understanding of the concept as ontologically 
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epistemic, since past experience directly or indirectly provides the 
human person with the scheme of knowledge that forms the 
foundation from which to interpret and interact with the present 
experience in planning for the future. Seen in this light, one could 
approach the concept of education as relating to all the systematic 
efforts meant to develop the epistemic potentiality of the human 
person in order to achieve, at least, three things: (i) to properly 
interact with his/her environment (ii) to benefit from the interaction 
with the environment, and (iii) to positively (in the ideal sense) 
impact on the environment. It must be noted that these efforts may 
be direct or indirect, formal or informal, or even non-formal in 
nature.  
Apart from the epistemic nature as well as focus of 
education so far examined, education also has a moral side to it. 
Education is also meant to normatively structure the mind of the 
human person on how to behave and how not to behave within the 
environment. 
As with other notions of wide intellectual consideration, the 
concept of human rights has also been extensively examined in the 
modern world. Griffin (cited in Tasioulas) traditionally 
conceptualises human rights as, 
 
rights that ‘a person has, not in virtue of any special 
status or relation to others, but simply in virtue of 
being human; [rights that] are grounded in our status 
as human beings, in particular; the dignity that 





Fagan corroborates the above conceptualisation by defining 
human rights as ‘basic moral guarantees that people in all countries 
and cultures allegedly have simply because they are people….
7
 In 
other words, we could state that human rights are meant to apply to 
all human beings everywhere, regardless of whether or not they have 
received legal recognition by all countries everywhere.
8 
Again, 
human rights are neither legally nor socially conferred on the human 
person. Rather, they evolved from what some philosophers have 
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conceived as natural law. It is this natural law that yields moral 
rights, which underpin contemporary understanding of human 
rights.
9
 Hence, the plausibility of the universality claim for human 
rights, a claim that would not be feasible if right were legally 
granted, since laws differ from one society and culture to another, 
and since what those laws approve and prohibit equally differ. It is 
this universality claim of human rights, in contrast to rights granted 
by positive law that informed the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, whose member countries are 
signatories.  One of the Articles of the UDHR, which is the focus of 
the present work, is on the right to education of the human person. 
Human rights are at the core of values central to the human 
person, since the human person would hardly be distinguished from 
lower animals if his/her rights were to be absolutely deprived. As 
human beings, we are endowed with the capacity to reflect on, to 
choose, and to pursue what we consider to be a good life.  It is the 
attempt to protect this capacity that we come to terms with the 
concept of human right, at least, in its normative sense. James Nickel 
holds this view when he explains that human rights are international 
norms that help to protect all people everywhere from severe 
political, legal, and social abuses.
10
 However, the foregoing 
understanding of human rights by Nickel merely satisfies, at least in 
part, our curiosity about what human right actually does. It does not 
specifically tell us the ontology of human right, that is, what it is that 
constitutes human right. In other words, Nickel tells us what right 
does, but not what right actually is, that is, what enables it to do 
what it does. In the latter respect, we have to consider Kant’s 
exposition of the concept of right.  
According to Immanuel Kant, it is quite easy to state what 
may be right in particular cases, as being what the laws of a certain 
place and of a certain time say or may have said; but it is much more 
difficult to determine whether what they have enacted is right in 
itself, and to lay down a universal criterion by which right and 
wrong in general, and what is just and unjust, may be recognised.
11
 
For Kant, a practical jurist may not know all this until he abandons 
his empirical principles for a time, and search in the Pure Reason for 
the sources of such judgments, in order to lay a real foundation for 
 





 Kant contends further that in the search 
made by the practical jurist, his empirical laws may indeed furnish 
him with excellent guidance; but a merely empirical system that is 
void of rational principles is like the wooden head in the fable of 
Phaedrus, that is fine enough in appearance, but unfortunately, it 
wants brain.
13
 What Kant implies is that an empirical understanding 
of law (and, of course, right), which is devoid of a basis in reason, is 
conceptually deficient. Considering this, Kant makes three basic 
conceptual clarifications in his exposition of what constitutes right.  
First, conception of right has regard only to the external and 
practical relation of one person to another, in so far as they can by 




Second, conception of right does not indicate the relation of 
the action of an individual to the wish or the mere desire of another, 
as in acts of benevolence or of unkindness, but only the relation of 
his free action to the freedom of action of the other.
15
 
Third, in this reciprocal relation of voluntary actions, 
conception of right does not take into consideration the matter of the 
act of Will in so far as the end which any one may have in view in 
willing it, is concerned. In other words, it is not asked in a question 
of Right, whether any one on buying goods for his own business, 
realises a profit by the transaction or not; but only the form of the 
transaction is taken into account, in considering the relation of the 
mutual acts of Will. Acts of Will are thus regarded only in so far as 
they are free, and as to whether the action of one can harmonize with 
the freedom of another, according to a universal Law.
16
 
In a simpler language, the Kantian understanding of right 
tells us that any talk of right only reasonably occurs within the 
context of extant and actively voluntary connection between X and Y 
(the claimant and the other against whom the claim is made), and the 
connection is such that it imposes correlative influence with respect 
to the two agents; if there is no relationship of this sort, then the 
issue of right is out of order. Furthermore, conception of right is 
concerned with only free and voluntary actions of the agents 
involved (the claimant and the other against whom the claim is 
made).     
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From the foregoing attempts to properly foreground a good 
understanding of the constituents of right, certain features are now 
salient. First, the whole idea of human right has a very strong basis 
in the critical reflections of moral and political philosophers, from 
the ancient era onwards. These philosophers have always argued that 
the human person is vested with moral and ontological dignity and 
worth, independent of the institution of the state, and which the 
institution of the state must recognise and protect. Immanuel Kant 
and some Stoic philosophers have grounded human dignity and 
worth in the power of reason. 
Second, human rights express both political and moral 
norms of human treatment in society. They are political in the sense 
that they are concerned with how people should be treated as human 
beings by the governments and the institutions of their states. 
Furthermore, they are moral norms, which apply to interpersonal 
conduct among the human persons in society. In the moral sphere, 
there are rights, such as rights against racial and sexual 
discrimination that are, according to Susan Okin,
17
 primarily 
concerned with regulating private behaviour. 
Third, human rights are also legally based. When human 
rights are grounded in the promulgated laws of the state, they are 
according to James Nickel, usually referred to as civil or 
constitutional rights.
18
 However, it must be made clear that what is 
regarded as civil or constitutional rights are, in the final analysis, 
grounded in morality. 
Fourth, rights are largely human-focused. From the classical 
era of ancient philosophy, through the medieval and down to the 
contemporary times, rights are almost always predicated on only 
rational human persons in society. However, there is presently a 
growing trend and literature within the disciplinary fold of 
environmental ethics, where such rights are being extended to non-
human sentient beings, such as lower animals, for instance. This 
trend, it must be noted, could be largely attributed to the influence of 
the works of some moral philosophers of the environment, such as 
Peter Singer and Tom Reagan, published some decades back. 
However, while rights predication made of the rational human 
person is open to no debate, rights predication made of non-human 
sentient beings such as lower animals, is subject to a hot 
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philosophical debate, especially, between those who hold onto 
anthropocentrism and their counterparts who are supportive of non-
anthropocentrism in environmental relations. 
Fifth, rights are always correlative with duties. For X to have 
a right against Y within a given context is to state that Y has a duty to 
fulfill the prescriptions of the right of X within the context. For 
example, to state that X has a right to life against Y means that Y has 
a negative duty to refrain from taking any action that could lead to 
the death of X, unless it could strongly be legally and morally 
justified. We have emphasized both legal and moral justification 
because it is conceivable to have a situation in which it is legally 
justifiable to have a person killed; though, the killing is not morally 
justifiable. In addition to a negative duty, to state that X has a right to 
life against Y also means that Y has a positive duty to take steps that 
protect the life of X.   
 
Education, Human Rights and the Problem of Justification 
The document of the UDHR has thirty (30) Articles, which are 
expressive of different rights conferred on the human person.  
Article 26 of this morally significant document expressly states the 
right of the human person to education: 
(1)  Everyone has the right to education.  Education shall be 
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. 
Elementary education shall be compulsory.  Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and 
higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the 
basis of merit. 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.  It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, 
racial or religious groups and shall further the activities of 
the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education 
that shall be given to their children
19
  
As one could readily see, each of the three parts of Article 
26 of the UDHR is ultimately focused on the education of the human 
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person in one way or another.  The first is concerned with justifying 
the claim of the human person to be educated; the second refers to 
the pragmatic purpose of education given to the human person, and 
the third affirms the influence of the parent on the education of the 
child.  However, it is the first part of Article 26 that mainly concerns 
the present study; though, some reference may be made to either of 
the other two in passing. 
Based on the premise of the first part of Article 26 of the 
UDHR, one could generally make a morally justifiable claim that the 
human person ought to be educated in society, bearing in mind that 
the bulk of what we now call human rights derives from the 
traditional conceptual understanding of moral rights.  This claim has 
at least two implications.  First, it is a claim of right made against a 
specific other, be it a responsible parent or a legally constituted 
authority in society.  Second, the claim elicits the idea of moral 
obligation, which generates a duty on the part of the specific other, 
to provide for the claimant, the requisite object of the claim. 
Though,  the opening sentence of Article 26 of the UDHR 
refers to education generally, however, a critical reading of the first 
part of Article 26 and the foundational concept of right, in the moral 
sense, reveals that this part of the Article could only justify what we 
call basic education in the modern era.  If this is granted, then 
professional and technical education and higher education invariably 
stand in need of justification within the same understanding of rights.  
The following explanation from the Wikipedia will suffice to prove 
the point being made here. According to the Wikipedia, basic 
education 
 
refers to the whole range of educational activities 
taking place in various settings (formal, non formal 
and informal), that aim to meet basic learning needs. 
According to the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED), basic 
education comprises primary education (first stage 
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If one looks intently at the wording of the second statement 
of the first part of Article 26, one could see a replication of it in the 
conception of basic education above.  One just needs to lexically 




Furthermore, one must remember that human right, from its 
background in the concept of natural law, is ontologically tied to the 
promotion of the moral worth of the human person, and not to some 
special/ unique abilities or skills, which distinguish some people 
from the other. Put in a slightly different way, this moral worth 
equally applies to all rational human beings, who are otherwise 
regarded as moral agents.  Thus, this human worth is the basis of 
moral rights in the ontological sense.  It is in recognition of this 
moral worth of all rational human beings or moral agents, that the 
second statement of the first part of Article 26 of UDHR makes 
basic education free and compulsory.  If it were not free and 
compulsory, but based on some special abilities that are not evenly 
distributed among rational human beings or moral agents, then some 
privileged ones, in terms of their special abilities or skills, or their 
special ability to pay, regardless of intellectual ability and / or skill, 
would be given the education, and some unprivileged ones, in terms 
of their economic or social incapacities, would not in this regard. 
Therefore, one could inferentially conclude that the second statement 
of the first part of Article 26 justifies the claim of the human person 
to demand for an open access to basic education in society, within 
the framework of the traditional account of human rights. 
However, since technical and professional education is to be 
made generally available but not equally compulsory, then it is 
based on some other criteria, which do not apply to all on equal 
basis.  It is only those who meet the criteria that would have access 
to the education. Perhaps, the ability to pay constitutes the 
fundamental criterion in this respect.  Since this is the case, it is not, 
strictly speaking, based on the moral worth of the human person. 
Thus, it could not be justified within the framework of the traditional 
account of right in society.  
Moreover, if the accessibility to higher education is based on 
the criterion of the ability to pay, then only those who have the 
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ability specified are given eventual access to it.  Since these 
requirements do not ontologically belong to all on the same equal 
level, it means that advanced institutional learning or higher 
education is not after all based on the moral worth of the human 
person, which is native to all moral or rational agents equally.  In 
other words, those who lack the specified abilities are excluded.  
Therefore, our traditional understanding of human right that derives 
from natural law would be unable to sufficiently justify higher 
education or advanced institutional learning in society.  
Furthermore, one could also see, critically, that the first 
conjunct of the conjunctive statement opening the second part of 
Article 26 could not be consistently held with the contents of the 
first part of the Article. The point is that if education is to be directed 
to the full development of the beneficiary, then it has to go beyond 
the basic level; it must include technical and professional education 
and advanced institutional learning. The composite of the former and 
the latter will maximally lead to the full development of the human 
personality. However, since the UDHR provides that only basic 
education is to be made free and compulsory, then the question now 
concerns how moral agents with the intellectual ability but who are 
unable to meet the set criteria, can justifiably access technical and 
professional education and advanced institutional learning? It 
appears therefore that the answer to this question is unclear and that 
technical and professional education and advanced institutional 
learning stand in need of justification within our traditional account 
of human rights. How then could this missing link be morally 
provided? 
 
A Complementary Pragmatarian Justification for Higher 
Education 
In this section, we shall evolve complementary arguments from both 
the pragmatic and the utilitarian theories to show the imperativeness 
of higher education to the resolution of socio-economic, political, 
environmental and other developmental crises that confront people 
in their quest for meaningful existence. This is with the view to 
providing justification, beyond the traditional moral rights argument 
for basic education, for the citizens’ access and indeed right to 
education at the higher level. As a philosophical theory of 
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justification, pragmatism is interested in the practical consequences 
and meaning of ideas in the real world. In other words, the 
justification for beliefs, concepts and theories is their application to 
and impact in the real world. As William James explains, “we think 
only in order to solve our problems…theories ought to be judged in 
terms of their success at performing this function”.
22
 The best theory 
therefore, according to the pragmatists, is the one that brings about 
the best consequences in actual life. In fact, its Greek etymology 
pragma, which means ‘work’, ‘act’ or deed’,
23
 substantiates the main 
claim of pragmatism that ideas are meaningful only if they can be 
translated into some kind of operation. Ideas are no doubt important, 
but on pragmatist principles, the consequences of such ideas for the 
lives of individuals and the future generation are of greater 
importance than the ideas themselves. The utilitarian theory of 
justification on the other hand is purely a formal teleological theory, 
whose criterion of right action is the maximisation of some 
particular sort of consequences of actions.
24  
 According to Brock, 
 
The theory [then] assumes different forms 
depending on what is singled out for maximization, 
i.e. how the value variable in the formal utilitarian 
formula is filled in. Among the features utilitarians 
have singled out for maximisation are pleasure and 
the absence of pain, happiness, human welfare, the 
satisfaction of interests, etc.
25 
 
Although, Brock acknowledges the complexity of the 
variety of objects of maximisation in the conception of 
utilitarianism, one point is still clear:  this moral theory is founded 
on the maximisation of the good consequence(s) of some human 
experience or the maximisation of the absences of the bad 
consequence(s) of some human experience in society. Thus, another 
proper way of describing the utilitarian account of moral assessment 
is, as a consequentialist account of moral evaluation of human 
conduct.  In this respect, according to Stubbs, right actions are those, 
which have good consequences while wrong actions are those which 
have bad consequences.
26
 The foundational property of utilitarianism 
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as a theory of moral assessment is the principle of utility.  Bentham 
(cited in Stubbs), explains this, 
 
…by the Principle of Utility is meant that principle 
which approves or disapproves of every action 
whatsoever, according to the tendency which it 
appears to have to augment or diminish the 




 On this understanding of the principle of utility, one could 
see that the happiness or welfare that is promoted is central to the 
utilitarian theory of moral assessment.  Furthermore, if one 
conjugates this with the utilitarian dictum of “the greatest good to 
the greatest number,” the conclusion is that the happiness or welfare 
promoted goes far beyond that of the act-performer only or any 
single other; it extends further to embrace the happiness or welfare 
of the greater other. In other words, if the happiness or welfare 
promoted is that of the act-performer only, then it implies that the 
right norm of social conduct is that promotive of the welfare or 
happiness of the actor. In this case, the happiness or welfare of the 
other becomes morally insignificant and irrelevant.  If, on the other 
hand, it is only the happiness or welfare of the other that morally 
matters, then that of the self becomes morally insignificant. 
However, the conjugated principle of utility and the utilitarian 
dictum simultaneously promote the happiness or welfare of both the 
self and the other in the final analysis. When the interest of the 
greatest number is morally significant or promoted, this invariably 
positively serves both the self and the other, at least, to an 
appreciable extent. This conclusion becomes inevitable so long as 
the theory is socially accepted as the basis of social interaction. In a 
situation where meaningful existence in terms of being able to afford 
the bare necessities of life is almost elusive and the ability to 
compete favourably with others in the constantly changing world is 
further still more elusive, the need for an approach that is result 
oriented towards problem solving becomes unquestionable. Given 
the fact that problems exist, one is therefore confronted with the 
responsibility of deciding which among the forms or levels of 
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education is able to achieve success in terms of furnishing an 
individual with the necessary skills that are required for development 
or the resolution of life’s problems. Put differently, at what level of 
education are the citizens sufficiently equipped to deliver the 
greatest good or happiness in terms of the resolution of social, 
economic, environmental and other developmental problems? The 
acronym, pragmatarian, is our coinage depicting the resulting 
synthesis of the ideals of pragmatism and utilitarianism. 
 The pragmatarian justification for higher education is 
apposite for two interrelated reasons. First is because the 
functionality of education in contemporary time is very central to its 
acquisition. As Akinpelu rightly observes, “…our age is one in 
which people are interested more in the material benefits or practical 
usefulness of any activity that is undertaken [including education].
28
   
This is the point advanced also by Ukpokolo, who insisted, while 
arguing for Educational Functionalism, that beliefs and points of 
view, as well as knowledge are rational in the light of the extent to 
which such beliefs and knowledge aid a people in engaging their 
environment, encountering their world and confronting their 
problems.
29
  For education to be functional in the sense just 
described, it must involve an extensive array of competence-building 
measures, which basic education cannot adequately provide. We are 
not here saying that basic education is not important, because, it is at 
this level of education that children are exposed to simple basic 
principles of life. But as the child grows up in life and these 
principles increase in details and complexities, the training they 
received at the level of basic education becomes inadequate for them 
to synergise these principles with life experiences. Basic education 
therefore becomes inadequate in furnishing the individual with the 
necessary skills required for effectively negotiating and engaging the 
challenges of the modern world. Virtually every sector of modern 
society is reordered regularly to meet the growing needs of the 
modern world, and to this extent, the tools, gadgets and modes of 
conducting activities keep changing and drifting continually from 
the competence of individuals with only basic education. The 
training received at the level of basic education then becomes for the 
individual, what Whitehead described as “little bits of knowledge 
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from which nothing follows”.
30
 Harald Gorst puts it more eloquently 
elsewhere: 
 
The product of the public elementary school is 
utterly useless, and generally wanting in 
intelligence. But these facts are only discovered by 
the victims themselves after years of bitter 
experience. Totally unfitted for any station in life, 
many of them leave school full of self-confidence in 
the belief that their superior education will secure 
them a good opening. Despising all manual labour, 
they seek positions as clerks, shop-assistants, and 
such-like. The result is, of course, an over-supply of 
candidates for employment of this kind. In 
consequence, the girls have to fall back upon 
domestic service; while the boys swell the ranks of 
unskilled labourers and unemployed loafers, or, 




Many societies today are indeed replete with proofs of Gorst’s 
observation. The modern man therefore needs specialized 
knowledge and proficiency which higher education inculcates, to be 
able to solve the problems that confront today’s world. In other 
words, it is at the level of professional/technical education and other 
forms of advanced institutional learning that the benefactors are 
equipped with the necessary skills preparatory for a future adult life. 
If according to Dewey, education is the “continuous reconstruction 
or reorganisation of experience which adds to the meaning of 
experience, and which increases the ability to direct the course of 
subsequent experience”,
32
 and if man is to succeed in his quest for 
the development of ways and means of improving his capacity for 
survival and for improving his society, then the foundation provided 
by basic education would need to be complemented by 
professional/technical education and other forms of advanced 
institutional learning. In this way, basic education becomes the 
foundation while professional/technical education and other forms of 
 
Ogirisi: a new Journal of African Studies vol 10 2013 
16 
 
advanced institutional learning becomes the superstructure. It is at 
the level of the superstructure that education would build in the 
citizens, the necessary competences for reorganising their experience 
and engaging their reality. Higher education is able to achieve this 
through high level performance training in researches and as agent 
for manpower and moral development. 
One of the approaches for dealing with societal challenges is 
through high level research. Research, according to Nwana, “is a 
process of finding out the solution to a problem…It is the ‘searching 
for’ something….But this ‘finding out’ or ‘searching for’ is not a 
blind and purposeless activity.  It is an activity with clear purposes 
in mind, namely, an activity, the result of which will contribute to, or 
constitute the solution of a real problem”.
33
 This means that research 
is not an end in itself, it is rather a means to an end, a means to the 
realisation of desired goals. Understood in this sense, research then 
becomes a tool for discovering the proper approach to the resolution 
of basic problems. Indeed, it is a way of exploiting reality and 
obtaining information and knowledge that would help us to survive 
in the world.
  
Since research is an endeavour associated mainly with 
higher level education, it therefore follows that higher level 
education is very central to the determination of the fate and the 
resolution of problems afflicting societies. And as Yoshihisa rightly 
notes, since higher education makes possible the research that is 
necessary to provide society with the requisite skills and 
competences for resolving problems, it is not too much to say that 




Furthermore, it is at the level of higher education that the 
manpower needed for the engagement of modern life’s challenges is 
developed. The report of the 1959 Ashby Commission set up in 
Nigeria corroborates this fact. The Commission was established by 
the Federal Government of Nigeria to assess the state of the nation’s 
high-level manpower development and to recommend ways forward. 
The report of the commission led to the establishment of the 
National Manpower Board, which was vested with the authority to 
forecast how the nation’s manpower needs could be met. To 
accelerate the training of high level manpower, the commission also 
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recommended the expansion and establishment of more higher 
institutions, especially universities.
35
 The commission so 
recommended because of its unwavering conviction that higher level 
education is capable of inculcating in people, the necessary skills 
and learning with which to master and perfectly fit into their society. 
 
So, another goal of higher level education, besides research, is to 
advance a beneficial and sustainable community through manpower 
development. 
Again, it is at the level of higher education that the 
relationship between knowledge and conduct is effectively 
cemented. According to Anthony Cortese, higher level education 
“provides the broad knowledge and skills for all professionals to 
create and sustain the necessary change in mindset.”
36
 The moment 
learning starts impacting on the conducts or actions of individuals, 
there will be a concomitant increase in moral growth, thereby 
making higher education an agency for moral and character 
development. 
In view of the centrality of education to research, as well as 
moral and manpower development, it is important therefore that in 
considering the right course of action to take in the resolution of 
social, economic and environmental crises confronting societies, one 
should think about which form of education is most capable of 
impacting individuals with the skills, manpower and moral rectitude 
that is required to meet the challenges of modern times. From the 
pragmatic and utilitarian points of view, the questions to ask would 
be: which form of education - basic or tertiary- works or works 
better with reference to problem solving. And which of these forms 
of education if made accessible to everyone would produce the 
greatest happiness? Also, since there is a constant revaluation of 
values occasioned by the interaction among world cultures, one 
ought to ask which level of education will better equip the individual 
with the intellectual resources needed to inculcate those norms and 
values that are cross-culturally sensitive and tolerant.  
For most scholars, higher education constitutes significant 
resources for the ascension of the majority to complete social power 
37
 by offering the skills for continuous learning and relearning in 
order to be up to date with events as they affect the individual and 
the world. As Homer opined, “to be content with the education 
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received at the basic level is to shut our ears against conviction; 
since, from the very gradual character of our education, we must 
continually forget, and emancipate ourselves from knowledge 
previously acquired; we must set aside old notions and embrace 
fresh ones; and, as we learn, we must be daily unlearning something 
which it has cost us no small labour and anxiety to acquire.” 
38  
This 
opportunity for emancipating ourselves; for setting aside old notions 
and embracing fresh ones is only provided by higher level education. 
Besides the pragmatarian justification for higher education 
as the batson of research, manpower and moral development, 
citizens’ access to higher education could also be justified on some 
other utilitarian grounds. As a consequentialist theory of moral 
assessment, utilitarianism is centrally concerned with the social 
consequences of the professional and technical education of the 
human person. However, in most societies, there are individuals who 
lack the financial power to pay for higher education, but have a 
demonstrable intellectual ability to perform, if given technical and 
professional education or exposed to training at the advanced 
institutional level. The only way one can make such category of 
people contribute positively to the society is to expose them to 
education at the professional/technical or advanced level, where they 
will consolidate on the principles learned at the basic level, by 
acquiring suitable skills and techniques that will enable them 
develop the higher faculties, and indeed, the various capacities of the 
mind. This level of education would provide the beneficiaries with 
the requisite access and expose them to the outcomes of advanced 
research.  
 If such knowledge is properly utilized, then its beneficiaries 
would most probably turn out to become dynamic inventors, 
producers and job creators and this would have a multiplier socio-
economic effect on the society at large. Besides, such beneficiaries 
would not only be building upon their professional and technical 
awareness, but would by so doing, also be building the 
epistemological base needed for the advancement and flourishing of 
the society as a whole.    
 Following from the foregoing, one could arguably contend 
that the right of citizens of nations to access professional and 
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technical education and other forms of advanced institutional 
learning finds a suitable justification within the frameworks of 
pragmatism and utilitarianism, as such opportunity would not only 
provide the beneficiaries of such education with the necessary 
competences that would enable them “ to live in balance with their 
environment”,
39
 but would in the long run improve the socio-
economic conditions as well as the epistemological base needed for 
the advancement and flourishing of the society as a whole.  
 
Conclusion 
This essay has attempted to critically examine the challenge of how 
access to education, beyond the level of basic education as provided 
for by article 26 of the UDHR, can be philosophically justified. The 
essay argued that the traditional moral rights argument could only 
justify the claim of the human person to basic education as contained 
in article 26 of the UDHR. This leaves professional and technical 
education as well as other forms of advanced institutional learning 
that actually equip their beneficiaries with the necessary 
competences to contribute to society, in need of justification within 
the framework of the citizens’ moral claims on the state. This 
justification finds a place within the pragmatic and utilitarian 
theories of moral assessment. Among the consequences of 
encouraging citizens’ access to education beyond the basic education 
level are that this would improve the socio-economic conditions as 
well as the epistemological base needed for the advancement and 
flourishing of the society.  Seen in this light, the pragmatic and 
utilitarian theories of moral assessment and justification of human 
conduct provides a complementary argument to that of the 
traditional account of human rights, in justifying the claim of a 
human person to education in the general sense.  
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